In this paper, we propose a measure of individual investor sentiment that is derived from the market for bank-issued warrants. Due to a unique warrant transaction data set from a large German discount broker we are able to calculate a daily sentiment measure and test whether individual investor sentiment is related to daily stock returns by using vector autoregressive models and Granger causality tests. We find that there exists a mutual influence of sentiment and stock market returns, but only in the very short-run (one and two trading days). Returns have a negative influence on sentiment, while the influence of sentiment on returns is positive for the next trading day. The influence of stock market returns on sentiment is stronger than vice versa. We argue that our sentiment measure simultaneously avoids problems that are associated with existing sentiment measures. 
Introduction
What influences the expectations of investors about future stock prices, and do these beliefs predict future stock returns? We shed light on these questions by deriving an aggregated measure of expectations for one group of investors. Our measure is based on the individual holdings of bank-issued warrants by private investors who trade via a large German online broker.
Traditional models in finance assume that deviations of security prices from their fundamental values can immediately be exploited by sophisticated rational investors. These investors recognize and exploit deviations from fundamental values by buying undervalued and selling overvalued stocks and thus moving prices back to their fundamental values. Less sophisticated investors, or those who trade on other than fundamental information, are classified as irrational or noise traders. In the neoclassical framework the above mentioned mechanism, also known as arbitrage, leads to the conclusion that irrational investors cannot influence equilibrium prices, earn inferior returns, and are thus driven out of the market in the long-run. However, DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) show that in the presence of noise traders, the mechanism of arbitrage is disturbed. If noise traders create stochastic noise that does not cancel out in aggregate, rational traders are confronted with an additional source of risk because noise traders may move prices even further away from fundamentals. In this situation, arbitrage is no longer risk-free for investors with a finite investment horizon. The consequence of this noise trader risk is that deviations from fundamentals can persist in the long-run. Since it is hard to determine what the equilibrium fundamental value of an asset is, noise trader models do not provide us with precise hypotheses regarding the direction and magnitude of the influence of investor sentiment on security prices or how investor sentiment is determined. However, what we can learn from these models is that stock returns influence investor sentiment and that investor sentiment can influence stock returns. Since it is essential to differentiate between groups of investors, we look at expectations of one special group of investors -namely individual investors from a big German online broker. Usually, those investors fit the definition of a noise trader. They do not have the time or money to obtain, nor the ability to interpret all available information. Thus they might be especially prone to the usage of heuristics, rules of thumb, or other simplifying decision rules in their investment decisions. Furthermore, various studies have shown that individual investors show different errors in cognition, which lead to biases like the overconfidence bias. They also demonstrate too much optimism in their expectations about future outcomes of stock prices (e.g. Barberis and Thaler (2003) , Glaser and Weber (2004) , and Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) ), which indicates that individual investors are most likely not fully rational. Therefore, the noise within the group of individual investors could be dependent on a non-fundamental variable -the investor sentiment. We investigate whether this sentiment is influenced by stock market returns or whether, in turn, the expectations of private investors influence returns of big and small company stocks.
What exactly do we define as an investor sentiment? It is the expectation of investors regarding the price of one or more financial assets that is not based on fundamental
information. An additional necessary condition for investor sentiment to influence equilibrium prices is that this sentiment is correlated within a group of investors. One can think of investor sentiment as the way a group of investors thinks about, for example, the future development of stock prices, which is not completely justified by rationality.
In other words, the models state that a group of investors whose beliefs are influenced by non-fundamental factors in a correlated way may affect the valuation of assets. There is a large volume of empirical literature that analyzes the mutual influence between stock returns and investor sentiment measures.
2
Empirical studies differ in various dimensions.
Most importantly, studies usually differ in the way they measure investor sentiment. This might be one reason why the results concerning the relation between stock returns and investor sentiment measures are mixed. Furthermore, existing sentiment measures are subject to several methodological problems. Individual investor sentiment measures based on stock transactions face the problem that, due to short sale constraints, it is harder to express negative sentiment for a stock through a sale compared to expressing positive sentiment through a purchase. In addition, it is difficult to calculate individual investor sentiment measures based on aggregate transaction data, since it is impossible to disentangle individual investors' transactions from the transactions of other investor groups, such as institutional investors. Survey based sentiment measures are confronted with the problem that investors might act differently in the market, where real money is at stake, as compared to questionnaire answers. These problems will be addressed in detail later in the paper.
In this paper, we propose a measure of individual investor sentiment that is derived from the market for bank-issued warrants
3
. We compare the number of investors who hold call warrants (positive expectations about the future price of the underlying) to investors who hold put warrants (negative expectations) on an individual level. Analyzing warrant transactions has a clear advantage in terms of inferring investors' expectations by their trading decisions when compared to the analysis of stock transactions.
4
The decision to sell a stock can have several reasons apart from the expectation that the respective stock will fall in the future. Examples include the demand for liquidity, portfolio rebalancing, or the (irrational) reluctance to sell stocks with a loss. In contrast, the purchase of a put warrant is a clear sign that investors expect falling prices of the underlying. Due to a unique warrant transaction data set from a large German discount broker, we are able to calculate our sentiment measure on a daily basis and test whether individual investor sentiment is related to daily stock returns by using vector autoregressive models and Granger causality tests. We argue that our sentiment measure simultaneously avoids all the problems mentioned above, which are associated with existing sentiment measures.
We find that there exists a mutual influence between sentiment and stock market returns only in the very short-run (one tp two trading days). Returns have a negative influence on individual investor sentiment, which in turn influences the return of the following day positively. This means that private warrant investors act as contrarians and that their expectations about the underlyings are correct, at least in the very short-run. The influence of stock market returns on sentiment is stronger than vice versa. We only find weak evidence that sentiment influences small stock returns more strongly than big stock returns as it was suggested by different authors.
5
3 The holder of a call (put) warrant has the right, but not the obligation, to buy (sell) a certain amount of the underlying security for a preconcerted price up to (American-style warrant) or on (European-style warrant) a preconcerted maturity date. The payoff structure of those warrants is the same as for plain-vanilla options. 4 The sentiment measures that are based on stock transactions compare stock purchases and sales (see e.g. Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) and Kumar and Lee (2002) ). They do so because private investors rarely hold short positions in stocks.
5 See e.g. Kumar and Lee (2002) and Neal and Wheatley (1998) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We start with a description of the bank-issued warrants and their market in Germany in Section 2. Section 3 provides a comprehensive overview of the literature in the field of investor sentiment. In Section 4, the data set and the methodology are described, while empirical results are provided and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes the findings of our research.
Bank-issued Warrants and their Market
Bank-issued warrants 6 (warrants hereafter) are only issued by financial institutions and are bought (almost) exclusively by individual investors. In contrast, traditional warrants are issued by the same company that issued the underlying of the warrant.
7
Since writing of warrants is impossible for individual investors, no margins are required and the size of the contracts is much smaller than in the options markets. Normally, the owner of one warrant has the right to buy or sell one-tenth or one-hundredth of the underlying with this contract (expressed by the conversion ratio), resulting in a median price of 1.45 Euro per warrant in our sample. Furthermore, transaction costs are close to those of stocks (median transaction costs per trade are 12.06 Euro), which makes warrants affordable for individual investors. The buying and selling procedure for the warrants is similar to that of stocks. Customers of the online broker trade these warrants within the same technical environment that they are used to from trading stocks. There is no need for an additional (margin) account to trade warrants. The only additional requirement is that you sign a form where you confirm that you are aware of the risks associated with these kind of securities.
8
Bank-issued warrants are well-known securities in continental Europe, Australia and in some markets in Asia. They are less common in the UK 9 and not existent in the US.
By far the largest market for warrants with regard to listed securities (see Figure 1) as well as turnover exists in Germany. In 2000, the premium turnover 10 of warrants on German exchanges was 83.30 billion Euros, which accounted for approximately 1.5% of total exchange turnover in Germany.
11
Another indicator of the importance of warrants in the German market is the growth of the number of securities. While 100 warrants were listed in different German market places in 1990, this number rapidly increased to 4,500 at the beginning of our sample period in January 1997. At the end of our sample period (mid of April 2001), 23,500 warrants were listed in Germany, and this number grew to 29,000 in August 2005.
12
Why are there so many warrants? Unlike options, warrants are not written on demand, but are rather issued, similar to bonds, on one particular date in a quantity defined in advance. Regardless of whether all warrants are sold at the day of issuance, they can be traded anytime within their lifespan. Legally, warrants are obligations from the issuer directly to the owner.
13
Furthermore, an issuing institution does not normally offer only one warrant with one strike price on one underlying but rather a whole series of warrants on one underlying. They vary the type of warrant (i.e. call or put), the strike price and the maturity date.
14 Every single security that was designed in such a way is listed as a separate warrant with a separate ISIN
15
. As a result, there is a large heterogeneity of securities in the market for bank-issued warrants.
This numerousness of different warrants cause some coordination problems that are addressed by a strong market maker structure in this market. The market makers are committed to providing liquidity for their own products, because otherwise, high costs of finding a contract partner within the group of individual investors could cause a market breakdown. They do so by quoting bid and ask prices for their warrants permanently.
10 The premium of a warrant is the amount an investor pays for the right to buy or sell the underlying for the strike price.
Since warrants are nothing else but the price of this right the premium is equal to the price of the warrant. The turnover data is the sum of all traded premiums within a year and not the sum of the values of the underlyings on which one holds the right.
11 See Voirin (2001), p.2. 12 In comparison, only 5.800 stocks are listed on the largest German stock exchange in Frankfurt.
13 While in the option market a clearing institution fulfills the obligations of a writer of a warrant who fails to fulfill his obligation, there is no such institution in the warrant market. Since all issuers in the warrant market are financial institutions this default risk should be small and have only minor price impacts.
14 Since the option market is much more regulated with respect to contract size and maturity dates options are better comparable resulting in more liquidity for these derivatives.
15 ISIN = International Securities Identification Number.
Although the issuers are free with regard to the level of prices, they are restricted in the maximum bid/ask-spread 16 and the minimum number of securities they are willing to buy or sell for the bid or ask price.
17
The consequence is that individual investors predominately trade directly with the market maker.
18
The structure of the market for bank-issued warrants implies that investors are not able to write these assets (i.e. sell them short). That makes arbitrage virtually impossible in this market. This is because the seller of the warrants is always a financial institution. It is very unlikely that they would sell a warrant for less than its theoretical price, and rational investors could only gain from arbitrage, if the warrants would be "too cheap". On the other hand, the issuers can vary the prices freely, including the possibility to raise prices if investors' demand is high for these products. However, since they are committed to a maximum spread, they also have to buy back the warrants for the higher price, making it less attractive for the issuers to quote high prices if the demand is high.
19

Related Literature
As stated before, many empirical investigations with different measures of investor sentiment were undertaken in the last decade. However, the results of these investigations were mixed. Some found influence of sentiment on market returns and some did not. In 16 Often the market makers commit to quote spreads not greater than 2% of the absolute value of the warrant. However, some defined special situations exist where the market makers could deviate from this rule (e.g. if prices are very low in absolute terms and the smallest price unit (usually one cent) is already more than the maximum spread).
17 Bartram and Fehle (2003) compare bid/ask spreads of similar derivatives on the German warrant and option markets and find that prices are higher but spreads are smaller in the market for bank-issued warrants. They conclude that it is more likely that institutional investors (i.e. hedgers) trade on the option while individuals (i.e. speculators) trade on the warrant market.
18 Both big market places for warrants in Germany, the European Warrant Exchange (Euwax) and the Deutsche Börse Frankfurt, implemented mechanisms that guarantee that buy and sell offers from individual investors are matched if they fall within the quoted spread from the market maker, resulting in a better price than if the individuals would have traded with the market maker directly.
19 Wilkens, Erner, and Röder (2003) find that for similar products which are traded on the same markets as warrants (i.e. discount certificates and reverse convertibles), prices are too high at the beginning of the lifespan of these products but convert to their fair values as they approach maturity. Their order-flow hypothesis states that this is due to that fact that at the beginning of the lifespan the risk that many investors sell back their warrants to the issuer is smaller than at the end of the lifespan, simply because less products are outstanding.
that context, a very important question is whether the used proxies for investor sentiment are appropriate measures. In this section, we first shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of these measures of investor sentiment and report empirical results afterwards.
In the next section, we demonstrate how we address the methodological problems and why our measure of investor sentiment can circumvent the most severe problems in the measurement simultaneously.
The proxies for investor sentiment used in the literature could be divided into two main categories. One the one hand, there are indicators that are derived from financial markets.
They can be subdivided into clientele-specific indicators derived from the behavior of individual or professional investors (e.g. transactions and portfolio holdings) and marketwide indicators. The latter imply micro-(e.g. book-to-market ratio) and macro-economic (e.g. interest rates) data as well as proxies from the fund (e.g. closed-end fund discounts), derivatives (e.g. put/call ratio), and IPO (e.g. IPO volume) markets and other time-series data (e.g. liquidity, momentum).
20
On the other hand, there are direct sentiment measures which are derived from weekly or monthly surveys among institutional and individual investors, managers or consumers.
21
The most prominent proxy for individual investor sentiment is the closed-end fund discount (CEFD) proposed by DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) . It is an empirical fact that closed-end funds are, on average, traded with a substantial discount on the net asset value (NAV) of the stocks in their portfolios. Rational reasons that are consistent with the neoclassical theory (e.g. agency costs) seem to be insufficient to explain the magnitude and the time variation of the discount. Since closed-end funds are predominantly traded by individual investors, their sentiment should affect the CEFD.
22
If individual investors become more optimistic (pessimistic) about stocks, they affect prices on the market somehow, depending on the portion of their aggregated demand. The higher the trading volume of individual investors 20 See Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) , Kumar and Lee (2002) , Rath, Tebroke, and Tietze (2004) , Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2005) , Baker and Wurgler (2004) , and Baker and Stein (2003) . 22 See Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), p. 82. in comparison with professional investors, the higher the influence of these individuals on the stock price is.
23
If the proportion of individual and institutional investors in the whole market and in the market for closed-end funds were the same, the discount would not change if individuals became more optimistic (pessimistic). However, since mainly individuals buy closed-end funds, the discount should decrease (increase) because prices of the assets on the market are undervalued (overvalued) from the perspective of individual investors.
24
Based on these assumptions, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) find that the CEFD measures individual investor sentiment and that this sentiment is able to forecast monthly stock returns, especially of stocks that are predominately held and traded by individual investors, e.g. small stocks, in the years from 1965 to 1985. In an even larger sample from 1933 to 1993, Neal and Wheatley (1998) find a positive relation between CEFD and small firm returns but no relation with returns of larger firms. They state that the CEFD is able to predict the size premium.
25
They also test other proxies for investor sentiment, namely net mutual fund redemptions and the ratio of odd-lot sales and purchases, with the result that redemptions are also able to forecast the size premium while the odd-lot ratio is not. There are also more critical views on CEFD as a proxy for investor sentiment and the influence on stock prices. For example Swaminathan (1996) finds in the extended data of Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) that the CEFD can indeed forecast small stock returns. However, the discount contains fundamental economic information about small firm earnings growth rates and future inflation, and thus, it is not a measure of sentiment but "a proxy of individual investors' rational expectations about future economic conditions and/or their risk aversion to macroeconomic risks".
26 Ross (2002) shows that if one understands the management fees of closed-end funds as options on the NAV of the respective fund, the level of the discount could be explained within the neoclassical framework.
27
Elton, Gruber, and Busse (1998) find that the CEFD 23 This is why primarily small stocks with low institutional holding are believed to be influenced by individual investor sentiment.
24 Note that a measurement of the private investors influence is only possible if one can differentiate the clienteles (e.g. institutional and individual investors) in the market. 25 The difference between small and large firm returns.
26 Swaminathan (1996) , p. 882.
27 Although it is unclear how the intertemporal variation of the discount and the empirical fact that in some periods closed-end funds are traded with a negative discount, i.e. premium, could be explained within this theoretical framework.
is not an important factor in the stock return generating process at all. Similar results are provided by Doukas and Milonas (2004) . They do not find evidence that investor sentiment, measured by the CEFD, affects the risk of common stocks in the Greek stock and closed-end fund market from 1997 to 2002. Qui and Welch (2004) The prior study leads to another field of measures for investor sentiment. Several studies test survey-based proxies for sentiment and their correlation with stock market returns.
Otoo (1999) also uses the MCCI and finds that in the period of 1980 to 1999 this indicator is influenced by returns of a broad stock market index (Wilshire 5000) on a monthly basis. This is also true the other way around, although the influence of sentiment on stock market returns is much weaker. In two studies, Solt and Statman (1988) and Clarke and Statman (1998) However, sentiment is influenced by returns that are lagged over these horizons. They attribute the wrong beliefs in the forecasting abilities of newsletter writers to different errors in the cognition of investors (e.g. "hot hand fallacy", "Muller-Lyer illusion", and "illusions of validity"). They also test other proxies for investor sentiment (e.g. CEFD, fund flows etc.) and find mixed and weak influence. A different survey-based measure of investors expectations and confidence is investigated by Shiller (2000) . He asked institutional investors about their bubble expectations and confidence every half year between 1989 and 28 They additionally show that the correlation between CEFD and MCCI is low.
29 Returns of the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
30 See Solt and Statman (1988) , pp. 50-54. Another common way to measure investor sentiment is to compare buy with sell transactions of individual investors. The usual measure is the difference between bought and sold volume divided by the sum of both. In their closely related studies, Kumar and Lee (2002) and Kumar and Lee (2004) show that over a six year period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) the sentiment indicator, based on the transaction behavior of 60.000 individual investors from a major discount brokerage house, has explanatory power for excess returns of small stocks, value stocks, stocks with low institutional ownership, and low priced stocks, but is uncorrelated with the overall market movement. An additional result of their studies is that the trading behavior of individual investors can explain comovement in stock returns. In contrast, Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) find little correlated transaction of individuals across stocks on a daily basis. They show that individuals act as contrarians (e.g. buy after stock price declines) and that sentiment, measured in the way described above, is a predictor of future stock market returns.
Another type of sentiment measure is provided by Baker and Stein (2003) . They measure investor sentiment from 1927 to 1998 (yearly) by the liquidity of the stock market in two ways: (i) turnover 33 and (ii) equity issuance
34
. In their model, they find that these 32 See Glaser and Weber (2005) for a comprehensive survey of the related strand of literature that analyzes the link between past returns and stock return expectations.
33 Ratio of reported NYSE share volume to average shares listed.
34 Ratio of common and preferred issues to the sum of these two items plus public and private debt issues. sentiment measures are highly correlated and have predictive power for future market returns.
A study that is especially interesting for our research is that of Han (2005) . This is because he analyzes the connection of index option prices and investor sentiment. Han futures; deviations of the S&P 500 index's valuation from its fundamental value, which is measured by the log-linear dynamic growth model of Campbell and Shiller (1989) . 36 Han (2005), p. 3.
37 Number of advancing issues scaled by the number of traded shares of advancing issues divided by the same ratio for declining issues.
38 Except for the ARMS index where Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2005) find some forecasting ability.
39 E.g. ratio of advancers to decliners, ARMS, ratio of stocks with new highs to those with new lows, put/call ratio, CEFD, changes in these proxies and near-term stock market returns. By principal component analysis they elicit their own sentiment indicator to obtain a cleaner measure of investor sentiment. They test the mutual influence of their indicator and stock market returns in a VAR model and show only limited evidence that their sentiment measure forecasts stock market returns. In contrast, they find strong evidence that returns influence the level of as well as changes in the sentiment measure. Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004) find a tendency of herding within a group of individual investors from an online broker measured by the herding measure of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) . Additionally, they test the forecasting power of a sentiment variable, the buy ratio
40
, for stock returns with a VAR model. They find a positive relation between net trading by individuals and returns.
41
Their results are especially strong in the very short-run (daily frequency).
Sentiment Measures, Data Set, and Methodology
We propose a measure of investor sentiment that is derived from warrant transactions in the market of bank-issued warrants. The underlying assumption is that people reveal their expectations about the future development of the underlyings of the warrants by holding call or put warrants. Since the value of a call tends to rise if the price of the underlying rises and the value of a put rises if the price of the underlying declines, holding a call is regarded as positive expectation, while holding a put is regarded as negative expectation for the underlying. By looking at the holdings of warrants, we can avoid the problem that occurs with sentiment indicators that compare buy with sell transactions.
42
Their problem is that buy and sell decisions in stocks differ in some aspects. In theory, informed as well as noise traders are equally likely to make purchases or sales either fund flows, number of IPOs etc. 40 The buy ratio is similar to the sentiment measures of Kumar and Lee (2002) and Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) but uses the numbers of investors instead of the volume bought and sold. This makes the measure robust against the behavior of a few wealthy individuals.
41 This positive relation disappears if limit orders, in addition to the here used market orders, are also considered in the analysis.
42 Analogously to the buy ratio of Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004) , we also calculated a sentiment measure that compares purchases in calls (instead of stock purchases) and puts (instead of stock sales) for every investor in a specific time period. The results (unreported here) are the same with regard to the direction of influence, but we obtain less observations per day, making the results a little less reliable.
based on the information available to them or randomly. In contrast, Barber and Odean (2003) show that the buying behavior, especially of individual investors, is influenced by attention grabbing events such as abnormal volume and extreme one day price moves.
The underlying idea is that individual investors are not able or willing (because of high transaction costs) to sell stocks they do not already own (short selling). Thus, they face different search problems when making buy or sell decisions. To purchase a stock, they have to choose from a set of several thousand different assets. Due to their cognitive limitations and time constraints, they are not able to analyze all these stocks and thus focus on stocks that recently caught their attention. Furthermore, a robust phenomenon when looking at selling decisions is the so-called "disposition effect".
43 Odean (1998) shows that individual investors are more reluctant to realize their losses than they are willing to sell their winners and that this finding cannot be fully explained by rational reasons like portfolio rebalancing or expectations about future price movements.
If one takes these points into consideration, the elicitation of investor sentiment from the trading behavior in stocks by comparing buy and sell transactions 44 is at least questionable. By looking at the transactions of individual investors in the warrant market, one can overcome these difficulties. This is due to the fact that investors can buy call and put warrants for the same transaction costs.
45
Since the holder of a put warrant earns money if the underlying loses its value, buying a put warrant is a kind of "short sale" of the underlying. Our assumption is that an investor who holds a call warrant reveals his positive sentiment about the underlying while the holder of a put warrant shows negative sentiment. Since we do not compare buy and sell transactions, we avoid the problems associated with differences in buying and selling behavior.
Additionally, our sentiment measure has some advantages compared to other proxies of investor sentiment. Due to a data set from a big German online brokerage, we are able to measure sentiment of investors on an individual level. Furthermore, the investors are private investors (median buy transaction volume is 1,886 Euros), and we look at transactions in warrants only, which are almost exclusively traded by individuals. Thus, we 43 See Shefrin and Statman (1985) .
44 See Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004) , Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) and Kumar and Lee (2002) .
45 E.g. transactions in warrants on the DAX are in 55.67 % cases call warrants and in 44,33% put warrants.
capture sentiment of individual investors only. It is a lot more difficult to control for the clienteles if one is looking at the CEFD or data from the option market as sentiment measures. The advantage over the CEFD is that rational investors have no incentive to buy warrants, since arbitrage is virtually impossible in this market. This is because the seller of the warrants is always a financial institution. As mentioned before, it is unlikely that the financial institutions would sell a warrant for less than its theoretical price. Rational institutional investors could only gain from arbitrage if the warrants would be "too cheap". If, in contrast, the discount in a closed-end fund exceeds its rationally justified amount, there is a possibility of arbitrage in buying the fund and selling the corresponding portfolio short. In the warrant market, the seller of the contracts is always a bank, while the buyer is an individual investor. That is the reason why we are able to measure the sentiment of individual investors. In the option market, it is unclear who sells the contracts to whom.
If, for example, only put contracts have been traded in a time period, the put/call-ratio would indicate strong pessimism. Since there are always two parties involved in an option contract it is difficult, if not impossible, to infer investor sentiment. The buyer of the put could be regarded as pessimistic, while at the same time the seller should then be positive.
To be consistent with theory, the differentiation in clienteles is essential.
There are a couple of sentiment indicators that can precisely differentiate clienteles. They do so by asking people directly in some kind of survey. There are surveys of institutional and individual investors, as well as managers and consumers that are regarded as sentiment indicators by different authors
48
. The problem all these surveys have in common is that they cannot control for what the participants are actually doing. There might be a 46 Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) , p. 83, argue that there are some limitations to arbitrage. Besides the problem of portfolio adjustment and costly short sales, the main argument is that there is a "discount risk" if the time horizon of the arbitrageur is not infinite. The takeover of the whole fund and sale of all assets as ultimative way of arbitrage is also discussed. The authors regard that as unlikely due to managerial resistance and regulatory restrictions in practice.
47 See Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2005) .
48 See for some examples Fisher and Statman (2000) , Qui and Welch (2004) and Shiller (2000) . divergence between what the participants answer and what they actually do in the stock market. There might be incentives not to reveal the true expectations if one knows that this could potentially influence stock prices in an undesired direction. If, for example, one owns stocks because he expects prices to raise in the future and he knows that a bullish result in a survey is regarded as contra-indicator, he has an incentive to answer as if he were bearish, even though he is not.
We derive our sentiment measure from a data set of daily transactions of individual investors who had accounts at a big German online brokerage between January 1997 to April 2001.
49
The data set contains transaction data , which provides data from November 1999 onwards, and from the Karlsruher Kapitalmarkt Datenbank (KKMDB), a capital markets research data base in Germany. The data sets from various suppliers make it possible to double-check our data. We combined the data sets and compared the characteristics of the warrants and did not find any discrepancies.
55
In the category "warrants", the online broker also subsumed 49 The warrant transaction data is part of a bigger data set that is described in detail by Glaser (2003) 50 The data set contains: the account number of the individuals, the date of the transaction, the security identifier (WKN), the number of securities traded, a purchase or sale indicator, the traded price per security, the transaction costs per trade, the total transaction volume, and the currency of the security.
51 Examples are Odean (1999) , Odean (1999) , and Gervais and Odean (2001) . Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2000) and Brown, Goetzmann, Hiraki, Shiraishi, and Watanabe (2002) looking at the transactions of individual investors in the market for mutual funds.
52 One special characteristic of warrants is that they exhibit a finite lifespan. If a warrant is not sold before maturity, no real transaction takes place. In our data set, this is only the case if warrants expire worthlessly. These warrant positions are closed by the online broker.
53 I.e. type (call or put), underlying, strike price, issuer, maturity date, style (European or American), and conversion ratio. 54 The European Warrant Exchange (Euwax) is the biggest exchange for bank-issued warrants worldwide. More than half of all the warrants are issued in Germany (see Voirin (2001) , p.4) and more than 80% of all trades in Germany were executed on the Euwax (see Euwax (2001) 
) in 2000.
55 In a few cases there were differences in the second position after the decimal point. These differences result from structured products like discount certificates and reverse convertibles that are traded on the same market places as the plain-vanilla warrants. We excluded those products (3,868) which are identified as non-plain-vanilla warrants, and these (667) where the necessary information was not available (e.g. no strike price, type etc.).
56
After putting the information about the transactions and the attributes of the warrants together, we tested whether the reported total trade volume equals the number of warrants traded multiplied by the trade price. This was not the case in 78 transactions, which we excluded. We also excluded the 415 transactions in warrants that are not quoted in DEM or EUR. This sample of plain-vanilla bank-issued warrant transactions consists of 103,904 transactions in 8,066 warrants from 1,499 investors (see Tables 1 and 2 ).
We divide these plain-vanilla warrants into five subcategories depending on the type of their underlying. Most of the transactions are in index warrants (47.71%) while most of the warrants traded have a stock as underlying (56.93%). The remaining categories are currency, yield and future warrants (see Table 2 ). Since we analyze the influence of individual investor sentiment on stock market returns and vice versa, we exclude all currency, yield, and future warrants from our analysis. 6,827 warrants with stocks or indexes as underlying, accounting for 90,342 transactions made by 1.455 individuals remain.
57
We calculate our sentiment measure from the holdings of bank-issued warrants by individual investors from a big German online brokerage. Using daily data we identify those investors who hold call warrants and/or put warrants or neither of them. We assume that investors who hold call warrants only expect rising prices and thus show positive sentiment. The holding of puts only is regarded as as sign of pessimism, i.e. negative sentiment. Investors who hold call and put warrants simultaneously as well as those who do not hold any warrants on a particular day are classified as neutral. Table 3 shows the mean and median number of investors per day in the three categories for all warrants and warrants on the DAX
58
. We chose to also look at warrants on the DAX separately for three reasons. First, it is the underlying that by far the most warrants are traded on (see imprecise conversion from Deutsche Mark to Euro. We then kept the true value.
56 This fact accounts for the differences in the reported number of warrants here in comparison to Glaser (2003) .
57 887 individual investors trade index and stock warrants, 209 trade index warrants while 361 trade stock warrants only.
58 The DAX is the index for the 30 biggest listed German companies. Table 4 ). Second, the DAX, in contrast to other underlyings, cannot be purchased directly on the stock market. Thus, it is a more symmetric decision situation when considering buying a warrant on the DAX. Third, potential insider information, no matter whether it is correct or not, is not very likely to play a role in the investment decision.
We constructed our sentiment indicator as follows:
with All t (u) = Opt t (u) + N eut t (u) + P ess t (u) and
and N eut t (u) =
and P ess t (u) =
where Opt t (u) (N eut t (u); P ess t (u)) is the number of optimistic (neutral; pessimistic)
individual investors on day t derived from holdings in warrants with u as an underlying
(u {All; DAX}). It is the sum of dummy variables that indicate the N investors who
hold warrants on day t. The dummy for optimists is equal to 1 if the investor i holds at least one call warrant but no put warrant ({Call t (u); ¬P ut t (u)}) on day t. For neutral investors, the dummy is 1 if he hold calls as well as puts or he does not hold any warrants ({(Call t (u); P ut t (u)) ∨ (¬Call t (u); ¬P ut t (u))}), and it is 1 for pessimists if an investor holds puts but no calls ({¬Call t (u); P ut t (u)}). All t (u) is the sum of all individuals who hold the underlying u at least once during the sample period.
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Sent t (u) is constructed as the difference of optimists minus pessimists normalized by the number of all traders in the respective period. is 0.5 it could, e.g. mean that in that period 3 times more optimists than pessimists held warrants (no neutral investors), but it could also be that the same number of optimistic and neutral investors (no pessimists) had warrants in their portfolio. Unreported results for the so specified sentiment indicator are similar to the numbers reported in Section 5.
otherwise and apply a two-sided binomial probability test.
As a second method to investigate the relation between the sentiment measures and stock returns we estimate vector autoregressive (VAR) models. Brown and Cliff (2004) also estimate the relation between investor sentiment and near-term stock returns using VAR models. Again, 10 lags have been used in our daily investigation. We estimate the following two regressions simultaneously:
where M a is the return of the stock market for indicator a (a {DAX, SDAX}). Sent
is our sentiment measure with the indicator c as a sign of whether the l evel or d ifference of the indicator is used (c {l, d}). Since Brown and Cliff (2004) showed that the absolute value of a sentiment indicator as well as the change in investor sentiment could be correlated with stock market returns, we decided to test both versions of our sentiment measure. P is the number of lagged periods (P = 10) while t is the respective day. To get closer insights as to whether sentiment influences returns or returns influence sentiment we also apply Granger-causality tests.
Empirical Results
Correlation of Sentiment Measures and Stock Returns
We calculated the four sentiment indicators described above from the holdings of individual investors in warrants with all underlyings and warrants with the DAX alone as the underlying. A correlation analysis
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shows that the hypothesis that the returns of the market indicators are independent from the level and changes of the sentiment measures can be rejected in most cases. This is especially true if sentiment is measured as the daily change of investors' warrant holdings. The correlation coefficients are negative in all cases, meaning that sentiment is better or changes in sentiment are positive if market returns 63 Spearman correlation coefficients are reported. We obtain similar results when we calculate Bravais-Pearson correlations.
are negative on the same day. Individual investors hold and buy more call warrants if the value of stocks decline. This is also known as contrarian behavior.
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Whether this negative correlation exists only contemporaneously or if this is also the case for lagged values of sentiment and returns is subject to the investigations in the next subsections. The sentiment measures are highly correlated with each other if both are measured either on the level (Spearman's rho 0.6564) or the change (0.6899) basis. Otherwise, the correlation is low and not significantly different from zero (see Table 5 ).
Comovement of Sentiment Measures and Stock Returns
To see whether changes in investor sentiment and stock market returns move in the same direction within the same period and in lagged periods, we classify the movement into the four categories described in Section 4. In Table 6 , one can find an example of this categorization. Table 6 shows that returns of the DAX and changes in the Sent
increased simultaneously on 314 of 1,080 days and decreased together on 208 days, while they moved in different directions on 558 (284+274) days. A two-sided binomial probability test shows that the 522 (558) moves in the same (different) direction are not significantly less (more) than the 540 (1080/2) expected moves for both categories. Thus, the null hypothesis that the movements of the sentiment indicator and the stock market returns are independent cannot be rejected. In Table 7 , we present the results of this analysis for all combinations of changes in our sentiment indicators with the different stock market returns. The table shows the number of simultaneous moves in the same period (lag 0) and when lags (lag 1 to lag 10) are used. "Sentiment" lag 1 to lag 10 means that the stock market returns are compared with the first up to the tenth lag of the sentiment indicator respectively. One star (two, three stars) behind the number indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) percent level. Table 7 shows that when market returns are lagged one and two days there exists a significant difference in simultaneous moves and moves in the opposite direction. Since a value smaller than 540
indicates that sentiment and market returns move into different directions, i.e. the corre-64 See Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) .
lation is negative, and all significant values are below this barrier, the results are in line with those from the former subsection. This also indicates contrarian behavior of individual investors. With the described method, we do not obtain such a significant relationship in the first two lags if the sentiment measure is the lagged variable. When this is the case, there is only mild evidence that the time series are related. Significant differences only occur if sentiment is measured from holdings in DAX warrants and if SDAX returns are considered. However, altogether the influence of sentiment on market returns seems to be low, and market returns influence changes in investor sentiment with lags of one and two days when the comovement is measured in the simple way described above.
Mutual influence of sentiment and stock markets: VAR regression results
To get further insights into the structure of the mutual influence of sentiment and stock market returns we apply the vector-autoregressive (VAR) model described before. Results are presented in Table 8 . Table 8 shows that mutual influence mainly exists in the first two lagged periods, meaning that there exists an influence only in the very short-run.
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The influence from our sentiment measure on returns is significantly positive with a one period lag, no matter how our measure is specified (based on holdings in all warrants or warrants on the DAX and on a level or difference basis) and which market returns (DAX or SDAX returns) are investigated.
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This means that in aggregate, investors are right with their expectations, at least for the day following a change in their holdings of warrants. We find a significantly negative influence in the second lag and thus a reversal compared to the first period, but only if sentiment is measured on the level basis. When we look at the influence of market returns on sentiment, we find that the influence is significantly negative for two lags, no matter whether our sentiment measure is specified as level or difference indicator.
These results are in line with the contrarian behavior showen in the former subsections and also found by other authors
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. That their exists mutual influence only in the short-run was also found by Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004) . The p-values are smaller, which 65 This is the reason why we report only the first 5 βs, although the VAR model is specified with 10 lags. There are no significant coefficients in the lags greater than 5. We do not report the coefficients for the lagged variables of the dependent variable (autocorrelation). They are not significant, except in one case.
indicates that the influence of the returns on sentiment is stronger than it is the other way around. This effect was found by most of the other empirical studies on the comovement of sentiment and stock returns as well.
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Additionally, we find that investor sentiment is more strongly influenced by market returns when we infer our measure from the holdings in DAX warrants than when it is calculated based on holdings in all warrants. In contrast, the influence of sentiment on market returns is stronger when our sentiment measure is based on all warrant holdings. We obtain similar results if we differentiate between the market returns. The influence of the returns on sentiment seems to be slightly higher in absolute numbers but less reliable when SDAX returns are considered. However, sentiment has a stronger influence on DAX than SDAX returns. This finding does not coincide with the conventional wisdom that individual investors have a stronger impact on small stock returns, at least if company size is a proxy for the ratio of institutional to private holdings of the shares in that company and thus for the influence of individual investors on the stock price.
Mutual influence of sentiment and stock markets: Granger-causality tests
To gain insights into the direction and the strength of the relationship between individual investor sentiment and market returns we apply Granger-causality tests for the first two lags of both variables in all specifications. Table 9 shows the results. By looking at the p-values, we find that the influence of market returns on sentiment is always stronger than vice versa. DAX returns always have a stronger influence on sentiment than SDAX returns. The results are mixed if the influence of sentiment on the returns is investigated.
Sentiment has a stronger influence on DAX returns when it is measured on a change basis. This is not always the case when we use the level sentiment indicator. In this circumstance we infer mixed results. Another result is that mutual influence is stronger with a lag of one instead of two periods if our sentiment measure is based on changes in the holdings.
The opposite is found if the sentiment is a level indicator.
Taking all results together, we find that there is a mutual influence of sentiment, measured as holdings of warrants, and stock market returns in the very short-run. Since warrants 68 See Brown and Cliff (2004) , Otoo (1999) , Solt and Statman (1988) , and Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2005) .
are held for a very short time period (median holding period is 9 days for all warrants), it is not surprising that there only exists influence in the days surrounding a change in the holdings. An additional result is that the influence of market returns, especially of the main German index DAX, on sentiment is stronger than vice versa. This is also not surprising, because the main indices are often in the media and thus may strongly influence beliefs of individual investors about future stock prices. However, since private investors normally only hold a small portion of the shares outstanding of listed companies, their influence on prices (in comparison to institutional investors), and thus returns, might also be small.
Theory suggests that the influence of individuals is greater if they hold relatively more shares in a company. When this amount is approximated by the size of the companies, we cannot confirm this prediction in our data set. Another finding of this paper is that DAX returns influence sentiment more strongly than SDAX returns. It is no surprise that past DAX returns affect trading behavior and thus our sentiment measures. In contrast to the returns of small stocks, which are aggregated in the SDAX, the DAX return is in the news every day. Recent related studies show that past market returns have a strong influence on trading activity. Glaser and Weber (2005) show that the effect of past market returns on subsequent trading volume of individual investors is stronger than that of own past realized portfolio returns. Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2004) find that "not only does that impact of past market returns on a typical security's trading activity survive the inclusion of lagged security returns in the same regression, it appears that the lagged market return impact is actually larger"
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. Nicolosi, Peng, and Zhu (2003) also find in their regressions that the impact of past market returns on stock purchases is stronger than the effect of past portfolio returns.
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All these studies have in common that past returns that are highly visible to investors affect behavior more than returns that are less visible or that have to be calculated by investors themselves, such as own past realized portfolio returns or the returns of some individual stocks.
69 Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2004), p. 22. 70 See Nicolosi, Peng, and Zhu (2003) , Table 2 .
Robustness and Discussion
To see whether our results are also valid for sub-samples we conducted some robustness checks. We divided the sample into different periods and repeated the VAR analysis as well as the granger causality tests (see Table 10 ). The sample was firstly separated into a rising and a declining stock market. The bull market period lasted from the beginning of our sample until March 7th, 2000, when the DAX reached its high with 8,064.97 points at that day's closing bell. The bear market started the next day and lasted up to the end of our sample. We additionally subdivided the sample into the single years.
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The analysis shows that the results were qualitatively similar in all periods with regard to direction of the influence, but with a much weaker reliability in the bear market and the later years of the sample. The influence of the DAX on sentiment was significant in all periods, while the influence of the SDAX on sentiment was significant in most periods. It was not significant in the bear market, which is mainly due to the weak correlation in the year 2000. The influence of sentiment on market returns, which was weaker in the whole sample, was reliable only in the bull market. In the bear market, sentiment influenced SDAX returns but not DAX returns, which is in line with the theoretical prediction that the influence of individuals is bigger on small stock returns, what we did not find for the whole sample. All together, we found that our results are stronger for upward moving stock markets.
Another concern about the robustness of our results is that only a few traders could drive the results in our study. By looking at the maximal trades per account in Table 1 , one can see that there is at least one person that traded more than twice per day. However, in our measure, these intra-day traders could account for only one data point per period because we are comparing the number of traders and not the volume they trade. That makes our measure less sensitive to the behavior of a few wealthy traders.
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. We also analyzed a volume-weighted measure and obtained slightly stronger results in the same direction. 72 Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004) specified their buy-ratio in a similar way (number of traders) while others, Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) and Kumar and Lee (2002) among them, used a volume buy-ratio 73 Results are not reported here, because we think that looking at the number of investors instead of the volume they trade gives us the better measure of investor sentiment.
In addition, investors are classified as neutral if they hold call and put warrants in one period, which is more likely for investors who trade a lot. Since there are on average 531 people for all warrants, and 197 people for DAX warrants are classified as positive or negative investors (see Table 3 ), these intra-day traders should play only a minor role. To be sure that this is true, we excluded all those traders who trade on average more than once per day. There were 11 trader in that category, accounting for 15,009 transactions which we excluded. The results remained almost unchanged.
Another point to discuss is whether the motive for holding the warrants, especially put warrants, might be hedging. There are several points that make it unlikely that hedging is the main focus of individual investors in the warrant market. The first is that the median holding period for all warrants is only 9 days and even less (6 days) for put warrants. In addition, Bartram and Fehle (2003) showed, by looking at the level and difference of bid and ask prices on the warrant and option market, that it is more likely that hedgers trade on the option market, while speculators trade on the warrant market. In a survey of a weekly investor magazine and a German discount broker, 4,345 individual investors were asked for their motives to trade warrants. Only 8% stated that hedging was their main motive to buy warrants.
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Another point is that a direct hedge
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was not possible for the DAX, since private investors were not able to replicate the DAX in their portfolio.
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All together, we think that hedging only plays a minor role, if any at all, in the market for bank-issued warrants. Even if investors buy warrants to hedge their long-term investment in the underlying with a put in the short-run, this means nothing else than that they see an increased possibility of a decline in the price of the underlying in the short-run. This is a change in their short-term sentiment.
74 See Klotz (2004), p. 16. 75 Direct hedge means holding the underlying and a put on the same underlying.
76 Today, exchange traded funds give individual investors the opportunity to hold a whole index at relatively low costs.
This was not possible in Germany during our sample period.
Summary and conclusion
Several sentiment indicators have been proposed and investigated over the last 15 years.
Overall, the empirical evidence of the influence of these sentiment indicators on stock market returns and vice versa is mixed. Some authors find a significant influence, others do not. In this paper we propose a measure of investor sentiment which is based on the holdings of bank-issued warrants by individual investors. With this work, we contribute to the ongoing research in the sentiment literature as well as the literature of the behavior of individuals in financial markets. Additionally, we are (to our knowledge) the first who empirically analyze investor behavior in the warrant market.
By exploiting the structure of the warrant market, we are able to construct and test a measure of individual investor sentiment. Due to a large data set from a German discount broker we can take a look at the daily individual transactions of private investors. Since warrants are traded by individual investors only, we can precisely specify the clientele we are looking at. Furthermore, we can avoid the problems with different motives for buying and selling transactions since call and put warrants can be traded for the same transaction costs, and thus, individual investors can symmetrically bet on rising and falling prices of the underlying. Furthermore, we are looking at real transactions where the investors put their own money at stake. This is an advantage over survey-based sentiment measures that might be biased since people could have an incentive not to reveal their true beliefs, depending on the interpretation and impact of the sentiment measure on stock prices.
We then test the mutual relationship of our sentiment measure with stock market returns in a VAR model and with Granger-causality test. We find that there exists such a relationship, but only in the very short-run (one to two trading days). The influence of stock market returns on sentiment is negative and stronger than it is the other way around where the influence is positive. We only find weak evidence that sentiment influences small stock returns more strongly than big stock returns as it was suggested by different authors.
Wilkens, S., C. Erner, and K. Röder, 2003, "The Pricing of Structured Products in Germany," Journal of Derivatives, 11, 55-69. * indicates significance at the 10 % level, ** indicates significance at the 5 % level, and *** indicates significance at the 1 % level. The reported βs and p-values are from the VAR model with 10 lags.
We only report βs for the first five lags for the reason of lucidity and because coefficients with larger lags are not significant. For the same reasons we do not report coefficients for these variables that are lags of the dependent variable. The first two columns specify the combination of the different sentiment measures with the two market return indicators on which the mutual influence is measured by the VAR model. *** (**, *) indicates significance on the 1% (5%, 10%) level. Results in Panel A and Panel B are for lags of one and two periods. Column 1 indicates which warrants are used to calculate the sentiment measure. Column 2 shows the direction of the influence. Column 3 and 5 report the F-statistic and Columns 4 and 6 the respective p-values. "Level" and "Change" refer to the way the sentiment measure is constructed. The tested hypothesis is that the indicator named first in the column "Direction of Influence" does not influence the indicator named after the arrow. 
